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Abstract: Using a new dataset which contains monthly data on 1,015 stocks traded on the 
London Stock Exchange between 1825 and 1870, we investigate the cross section of stock 
returns in this early capital market.  Unique features of this market allow us to evaluate the 
veracity of several popular explanations of asset pricing behavior. Using portfolio analysis and 
Fama-MacBeth regressions, we find that stock characteristics such as beta, illiquidity, dividend 
yield, and past-year return performance are all positively correlated with stock returns. 
However, market capitalization and past-three-year return performance have no significant 
correlation with stock returns.   
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1. Introduction 
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The patterns of cross-sectional stock returns (e.g., size effect, value effect, reversal effect, 
momentum effect etc) have been documented by many studies of modern financial markets 
(Banz, 1981; De Bondt and Thaler, 1984; Rosenberg et al., 1985; Fama and French, 1992; 
Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993).  These phenomena are sometimes called “anomalies” because 
these return patterns appear not to be explained by the classical asset pricing models.  Since 
their discovery, a large strand of theoretical and empirical work has attempted to provide 
rationalization for these stock market “anomalies”.  First, several studies have proposed risk-
based explanations (Zhang, 2005; Liu, 2006; Hahn and Lee, 2006; Xing, 2008; Campbell et al., 
2010).  Among these, a well-known risk explanation for the size and value effect is that market 
capitalization and value indicators (e.g., B/M ratio, dividend yield, price earnings ratio) capture 
the distress risk omitted by standard asset pricing models (Chan and Chen, 1991; Fama and 
French, 1993, 1995, 1996; Ferguson and Shockley, 2003).  Second, many studies try to explain 
the anomalies using behavioral biases in individual decision-making.  For example, investor 
overreaction has been proposed as an explanation for the value and the reversal effects 
(Lakonishok et al., 1994; De Bondt and Thaler, 1984, 1987; Daniel et al., 1998).  Third, some 
studies argue that the institutional environment, such as tax or the behavior of institutional 
investors, helps to explain the anomalies (Jiang, 2010; Gompers and Metrick, 2001).  One 
example is the tax-loss selling hypothesis, which has been an important candidate explanation 
for the January effect and the reversal effect (Reinganum, 1983; George and Hwang, 2007).  
Fourth, Lo and MacKinlay (1990) and Black (1993) highlight a potential data-snooping bias in 
the tests for anomalies, thus casting doubt on their very existence in the first place.    
As modern global financial markets have become increasingly integrated, Schwert 
(2003) points out that repeatedly rediscovering similar results from positively correlated 
samples may not provide much additional evidence in favor of the “anomalies”.  Therefore 
asset pricing behavior in a large, non-US market in the nineteenth century may provide strong 
2 
 
out-of-sample evidence.  Consequently, in this study, using a unique dataset that contains 
monthly data on 1,015 stocks traded on the London Stock Exchange from 1825 to 1870, we 
investigate the cross-section of stock returns in this early stock market.  We focus on two of 
the best known stock pricing patterns, namely the size effect and value effect, but we also 
examine the relation between stock returns and several other stock characteristics, including 
beta, illiquidity, past one year performance, and past three year performance.   
The motivations for this study are threefold.  First, apart from the possibility of a data-
snooping bias, the recent disappearance of the size effect (Dimson and Marsh, 1999; Hirshleifer, 
2001; Amihud, 2002) has raised further questions about the robustness of asset pricing 
anomalies.  Alternatively, Schwert (2003) suggests that it is probable that the anomalies were 
always in existence, but they have been arbitraged away following their discovery.  It is also 
possible, however, that the disappearance of the anomalies may itself be a temporary 
phenomenon.  An investigation of asset pricing behavior in historical financial markets, 
particularly one from a period long before the discovery of the anomalies, may help to shed 
some light on these issues as well as indirectly testing the data-snooping hypothesis.  
Second, investigating asset pricing behavior in the nineteenth-century London market 
can be viewed as a natural experiment which allows us to examine asset pricing in the absence 
of influential factors such as taxes and institutional investors.  To begin with, the London 
market operated in a laissez-faire environment, with zero corporate taxes, capital gain taxes 
and near-zero income taxes, minimal listing requirements, and very little in the way of statutory 
investor protection and securities law (Turner et al., 2013).  Therefore, hypotheses that rely on 
taxes to explain stock return patterns do not apply in this market.  Several studies document 
the influence of institutional investors upon stock pricing for modern markets (Gabaix et al., 
2006; Jiang, 2010; Da and Gao, 2010).  Institutional investors’ trading activities, however, do 
not influence stock returns in our sample as they did not invest in the equity market during this 
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era (Turner et al., 2013).  In addition, to the extent that individual investors are less rational 
than professionals, any stock return patterns that arise due to individual investors’ behavioral 
biases should be particularly pronounced in a market where individual investors dominate. 
This unique institutional environment in the nineteenth-century London market 
provides a good opportunity to evaluate two competing theories of the long-term reversal effect: 
the tax-loss selling hypothesis and the overreaction hypothesis.  In particular, in this historical 
market, we should not observe the reversal effect if the tax-loss selling hypothesis holds and 
there should be a strong reversal effect if the overreaction hypothesis holds.  
Third, although only stocks with limited liability are traded on modern markets, this 
was not the case in the British stock market over our sample period, since there existed stocks 
with extended liability (i.e., unlimited liability, double liability or partially-paid stocks) as well 
as standard limited liability stocks (Acheson et al., 2012).  The coexistence of both types of 
stocks makes it possible to test the distress-risk explanation of the size and value effects.  Stocks 
with extended liability existed to protect creditors from expropriation because, in the event of 
bankruptcy, shareholders had to cover the company’s debt out of their personal wealth.  
Therefore, the costs to shareholders related to financial distress or bankruptcy would be larger 
for stocks with extended liability.  Thus, one would expect that the returns of these special 
stocks should therefore be much more sensitive to distress risk than the returns of standard 
stocks.  In addition, if size or value indicators capture the distress risk of the firm, we should 
observe a stronger size effect or value effect within the subsample of special stocks than in the 
subsample of standard limited liability stocks.  We exploit this unique feature of this early stock 
market to test whether this was indeed the case.    
This study contributes to the strand of literature that has investigated the pattern of 
cross-sectional stock returns in the UK market (Levis, 1989; Strong and Xu, 1997; Morgan and 
Thomas, 1998; Dissanaike, 1999; Liu et al., 1999; Gwilym et al., 2000; Gregory et al., 2001; 
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Hon and Tonks, 2003; Morelli, 2007).  This study also contributes to the literature which has 
investigated cross-sectional stock returns in historical financial markets.  Korolenko and Baten 
(2005) demonstrate the existence of the size effect in the German stock market in the period 
1871 to 1914.  However, Bossaerts and Fohlin (2000) find the opposite using annual data on 
50 companies from 1881 to 1913.  Fohlin and Reinhold (2010) demonstrate a negative book-
to-market effect in their sample with monthly data on 37 firms, covering the period 1904 to 
1910.  For the UK market, using annual data for 1871 to 1913, Grossman and Shore (2006) 
find no size effect and some evidence of a value effect.   
Our paper, however, represents large improvements over previous studies on historical 
stock markets.  First, we examine stock returns in Britain, which had by far the most developed 
capital market in the nineteenth century.  Second, we use a comprehensive dataset of stocks 
traded on the London Stock Exchange over a relatively long period (45 years).  This dataset 
covers a broad range of sectors in the economy and is thus free from survivor bias.  Third, we 
address the delisting bias problem in our empirical analysis.  Fourth, as well as extending the 
analysis of Grossman and Shore (2006) further back to a more formative stage of the British 
stock market, we use monthly data, which allows us to use Fama and MacBeth (1973) 
regressions.   
Our findings suggest that there is little evidence of a size effect in this early market.  On 
the other hand, using dividend yield as the indicator of value and growth, we find strong 
evidence of a value effect.  Both of these findings are robust to a battery of robustness checks.  
The cross-sectional regression analysis demonstrates that special stocks (i.e., stocks with 
extended liability and partially-paid capital) do not seem to have stronger value premiums than 
standard fully-paid limited liability stocks, suggesting that distress risk is not a plausible 
explanation for the value effect.  The Fama-MacBeth regression analysis also indicates that, 
similar to the results from modern stock markets, stock returns in this historical market are 
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positively correlated with beta, illiquidity and momentum measures.  However, we find that 
stock returns in our sample are uncorrelated with the reversal variable, which indicates that the 
reversal effect which exists in modern markets may not exist in our sample.   
Our out-of-sample study of the stock pricing behavior in this nascent stock market 
allows us to evaluate various explanations for the patterns of stock returns.  The absence of a 
size effect in our sample and in Grossman and Shore (2006) corresponds to the evidence that 
the size effect in the US market disappeared in the post-1980s era.  Taken together, this suggests 
that the size effect may not be a perennial feature of equity markets.  It is also consistent with 
the data-snooping explanation for the size effect.  Contrastingly, the value premium tends to 
be much more persistent as it exists in both historical and modern stock markets, perhaps 
suggesting that the value effect may not be an “anomaly” after all.  However, our evidence 
provides no support for the distress risk explanation of the value effect, which corresponds to 
the findings of Dichev (1998) and Campbell et al. (2008), who suggested that the distress risk 
premium in the modern stock market is negative rather than positive.  Finally, the absence of a 
reversal effect in this era is consistent with the tax-loss selling hypothesis rather than the 
overreaction hypothesis.    
This paper is structured as follows.  Section two describes the data used in this study.  
Section three focuses on the performance of size-sorted and dividend-yield-sorted portfolios.  
We also consider the delisting-bias-adjusted portfolio returns as well as portfolio returns which 
take into account the influence of market risk as well as SMB and HML factors.  In addition, 
we discuss the results of several robustness tests within the portfolio framework.  In section 
four, we investigate the relationship between stock returns and stock characteristics using the 
Fama-MacBeth regression methodology.  Section five concludes.  
 
2. Data sources 
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The stocks employed in this study are the constituents of the nineteenth-century stock indices 
constructed in Acheson et al (2009). The main data source is the Course of the Exchange (COE), 
which from the beginning of the nineteenth century was the official price list for the London 
Stock Exchange (LSE).  Although the LSE at this time did not have any restrictions on 
securities that could be traded on the floor, not every security obtained a quotation on the 
market’s official list.  A company’s inclusion on the official list was mainly based on the 
anticipation of potential trading which generated business for the LSE (Michie, 1999, pp.86-7, 
96).  The prices printed in the official list are usually the transaction prices from the previous 
day, which were obtained from the floor through the process called “marking a bargain” 
(Wither, 1910, p.258). 1   The market was usually made by stock jobbers, who acted as 
intermediaries between brokers, who were buying and selling on behalf of their clients.2  The 
brokers received commissions from their clients and the jobbers got their profits from the bid-
ask spread (Michie, 1999, pp.119-20).   
For listed securities, the COE reported dividends, transaction prices from the last trade 
of the day, number of issued shares, nominal and paid-up values of stock.  We hand-collected 
this data for each common stock listed in the COE for every month between March 1825 and 
December 1870. 3   The entire dataset contains 122,414 observations, consisting of 1,015 
common equity stocks issued by 681 companies.  These companies were from a wide range of 
sectors, including banks, bridges, mining, canals, docks, gas-light and coke, insurance, roads, 
railways, telegraphs, waterworks, and miscellaneous industrial and commercial firms.   
As can be seen from Table 1, which displays the descriptive statistics for the main 
variables in the dataset, stocks typically had high denominations in this early capital market, 
and around half of the observations in the dataset are for stocks which were partially-paid or 
had extended shareholder liability.   
<INSERT TABLE 1> 
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Although our dataset represents the best available data for the stock market in the 1825-
70 period, it differs from modern stock data in several ways.  First, there was thin trading of 
stocks in this period.  At a monthly frequency, about 23% of observations have no stock price 
quotations due to not being traded.  As a result, returns for the months with no quotations 
cannot be calculated.  Since the severity of this problem across stocks may be correlated with 
stock characteristics (e.g., size and value), omitting observations with no prices may introduce 
a selection bias into our analysis.  We therefore use three methods to alleviate this problem.  In 
the first method, we fill in months which have no quotations with the last available price for 
the same stock.  In the second method, for the months when trades did not occur, stock returns 
are set equal to the average monthly returns for the same stock over the sample period.  The 
final method simply excludes from the analysis the observations with no price quotations. Since 
our results are not sensitive to which method is used, we only report the results from the third 
method.   
Second, the COE lacks information about why stocks delisted from the LSE and the 
related delisting return.  As ignoring delisting returns when evaluating stock performance could 
induce a bias (Shumway, 1997; Shumway and Warther, 1999), we take several steps in section 
three to correct for any such bias.   
Third, good quality accounting data which would enable us to calculate a book-to-
market ratio does not exist for most of the stocks in our dataset.  Consequently, in order to 
identify the growth and value features of a stock, we use the dividend yield, defined as the sum 
of dividend paid in the year divided by the end-of-year stock price, as the measure of value.4   
 
3. Performance of size and dividend-yield-sorted portfolios 
3.1 Summary statistics and returns on size and dividend-yield-sorted portfolios 
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Given the importance and ubiquity of the size and value effects, this section examines the 
performance of size and dividend-yield-sorted portfolios using the portfolio approach.  At each 
December, we divide the selected sample of stocks into five portfolios according to the ranking 
of their market capitalization or annual dividend yield.  A stock had to have a price observation 
in December and have been listed for at least six months in the prior year in order to be included 
in any portfolio.  These restrictions are imposed in order to compute the updated market 
capitalization and comparable liquidity measures for each stock.   
Both the 1-month and 12-month holding-period returns in the year after the portfolio 
formation are calculated for the five portfolios.  The monthly return for a stock is the sum of 
its monthly capital gain and its monthly dividend yield.  Since the dividend rates for each stock 
in our dataset are annual, we follow Fama and French (1998) by dividing the annual dividends 
by 12 when calculating the monthly dividend yield.  This treatment assumes that the capital 
gain component of the return has the volatility and covariance structure of the total return.  The 
12-month holding-period returns are the sum of annual capital gains and dividend yields, with 
annual capital gain calculated as the continuously compounded monthly capital gain, and the 
annual dividend yield calculated as the sum of dividends paid by the stock in the year divided 
by the beginning-of-year stock price.  To avoid the influence of outlier returns on our portfolios, 
we winsorize returns at the 0.005 and 0.995 percentiles.  The return of a portfolio is the average 
return of its constituent stocks.  We report the results for the equally-weighted portfolio returns 
because such a weighting methodology better reveals the features of the average stock.5 
The process of portfolio formation and return calculation is repeated for every 
December between 1825 and 1870.  Then, for each portfolio, we calculate the time-series 
average of 540 months (i.e., from January 1826 to December 1870) of 1-month holding-period 
returns and the time-series average of 45 years (i.e., from 1826 to 1870) of 12-month holding-
period returns.  The performance of various portfolios is compared and the existence of a size 
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or value premium is identified mainly through testing whether the differential returns between 
the top and bottom portfolios are statistically different from zero.  
Table 2 displays the time-series average of several important variables across the 45 
formation Decembers for the portfolios formed on size.  For comparison purposes, it also 
reports the statistics for the 1871-1913 British market and the 1926-1999 CRSP dataset, both 
of which are based on statistics provided in Grossman and Shore (2006).   
<INSERT TABLE 2> 
Table 2 shows that dividends played an important role in the nineteenth-century British 
stock market.  All five portfolios formed on size have dividend yields above 4%.  Compared 
with Britain in the 1870-1913 period and the modern US market, small stocks performed better 
in terms of dividend payments in pre-1870 Britain.  On average, around 39% of the smallest 
quintile of stocks did not pay dividends in a particular year in our dataset, while around 48% 
and 66% of the smallest quintile of stocks paid zero dividends in the 1870-1913 British dataset 
and the 1926-1999 CRSP dataset respectively.  In addition, small stocks were also more likely 
to pay high dividends in the 1825-1870 British market.  About 36% of the stocks in the first 
quintile size-sorted portfolio paid high (dp4) or very high (high) dividends in our dataset.  This 
same figure was around 31% over the 1871-1913 period, and around 20% in the twentieth-
century CRSP dataset.   
Similar to the other two samples and consistent with prior expectations, smaller stocks 
tend to have lower past returns and higher rates of delisting in our sample.  Smaller stocks also 
appear to be less liquid as there exists a monotonically negative relationship between size and 
illiquidity. 
From Panel A in Table 3, which presents the performance of the size-sorted portfolios, 
we can see that there exists some negative relationship between size and stock returns for both 
the 1-month and 12-month investment horizon.  However, this relationship is quite weak.    The 
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size premium, defined as the differential returns between the small and big portfolios, is only 
significantly different from zero for the 1-month holding period return.  
<INSERT TABLE 3> 
Using the 1-month holding-period returns, we also calculate the risk-adjusted returns 
for each portfolio using both the CAPM and Fama-French three-factor model to isolate the 
influence of differential risks across various portfolios.  We regress the equally-weighted 
portfolio excess returns on the value-weighted excess returns of the market portfolio, SMB 
factor and HML factor.  The SMB and HML factors are constructed following Fama and French 
(1993).6  The risk-adjusted returns are the intercepts of the CAPM or the Fama-French three-
factor regressions.  In order to control for possible bias in the estimation of the risk loadings 
due to the thin trading problem, we report the results for the risk-adjusted returns where the 
bias is corrected using Dimson’s (1979) method.7    
Panel A of Table 3 suggests that, similar to the evidence for the modern US market, the 
Fama and French three-factor model performs better than the CAPM in explaining stock returns.  
The CAPM has difficulties explaining the returns for small stocks since, apart from the 
portfolio big, the CAPM-adjusted returns are significantly different from zero, suggesting that 
the beta risk alone cannot explain the returns on small stocks.  However, this is not the case for 
the Fama and French three-factor-adjusted returns.  We can see that most of the three-factor-
adjusted returns are not significantly different from zero.  Moreover, the GRS F-tests cannot 
reject the null hypothesis that the three-factor-adjusted returns for the size-sorted portfolios are 
jointly equal to zero.  The last row of Panel A in Table 3 shows that the differential return on 
the small minus big portfolio is no longer significantly different from zero after we control for 
the SMB and HML factors.    
The finding of no size effect in pre-1870 Britain is largely consistent with that of 
Grossman and Shore (2006), who found that, except for the smallest 5% of stocks, there is no 
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relationship between size and return in the British stock market in the 1871-1913 period. In 
addition, several studies on the more recent UK stock market have also found little evidence 
of a size effect (Levis, 1989; Strong and Xu, 1997; Morelli, 2007). 
We also calculate the average size premiums for the 45 Januarys between 1826 and 
1870 (results not reported).  However, we find that size premiums are not significantly different 
from zero in Januarys.  Therefore, the January effect discovered by Keim (1983) and Brown et 
al. (1983) does not exist in our sample.  Notably, the two most popular explanations of the 
January effect: the tax-loss selling and the window-dressing hypotheses, do not apply in our 
period since tax rates were effectively zero and there were virtually no institutional investors 
during this era.   
To examine the value effect, we construct five portfolios based on dividend yield.  At 
each December, we calculated the annual dividend yield for the current year for each stock.  
We assigned the stocks that paid no dividends in the year to the zdp portfolio, and divided the 
remainder into four quartiles.  The value premium is defined as the differential return between 
the high-yielding (high) and low-yielding (low) portfolios.  
Table 4 reports the summary statistics of these dividend-yield-sorted portfolios, as well 
as the same statistics for the 1871-1913 Britain and the 1926-1999 CRSP datasets.  From Panel 
A of Table 4, we see that, similar to modern financial markets, both zero-yielding and high-
yielding stocks tend to have smaller market capitalization.  Unlike the size-sorted portfolios, 
there does not appear to be any relationship between liquidity and value.  In addition, there 
exists no relationship between delisting rate and value.  
<INSERT TABLE 4> 
Similar to the two other datasets, the growth stocks in the low portfolio performed better 
than the value stocks in the high portfolio in the year before they are included in the portfolios.  
However, the differential past returns between low and high portfolios are smaller in both 
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British datasets than the CRSP dataset.  In addition, the zero-yielding stocks had much better 
past performance in the modern US market, while they are the worst-performing stocks in the 
pre-1913 UK market.  This difference may arise because the zero-yielding stocks in the US 
dataset include many of those that distribute wealth to shareholders through stock repurchases, 
as well as those that have strong growth potential.  In contrast, stock repurchases were not used 
in nineteenth-century Britain to return earnings to shareholders, and stocks that did not make 
dividend payments may have been more likely to be those that did not perform well (Braggion 
and Moore, 2011; Turner et al., 2013).  From Panel B of Table 3, we can see that zero-yielding 
stocks, unlike those in the twentieth-century US market, did not enjoy high returns in our 
sample.  Indeed, they barely outperformed low-yielding stocks.   
Table 3 also reveals that the value premium exists in our sample.  The unadjusted value 
premiums, defined as the differential returns between the low-yielding and high-yielding 
portfolios, are statistically different from zero at the 1% significance level in all cases.  The 
risk-adjusted value premium remains significantly different from zero whether we use the 
CAPM or Fama and French’s (1993) model.  In addition, the GRS tests clearly reject the 
hypothesis that the returns for the dividend-yield-sorted portfolios can be explained by either 
the CAPM or the Fama-French three-factor model.  Notably, the strong influence of dividend 
yield on stock returns has also been documented in several studies of the modern UK market 
(Levis, 1989; Morgan and Thomas, 1998; Gwilym et al., 2000). 
 
3.2 Delisting-bias-corrected portfolio performance  
In order to address the delisting bias, we attempted to identify which of the 762 stocks 
disappeared from our sample due to failure.  First, we found that 104 of these 762 stocks did 
not vanish due to bankruptcy since other securities issued by the same firms were still traded 
on the stock market in 1870.  Second, through examining the 1871-1875 issues of the Investor’s 
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Monthly Manual, we found that another 77 stocks had simply migrated their listing from the 
London Stock Exchange to a regional stock exchange.8  Third, using Lewin (1968), which 
gives details of the name changes or mergers for railways, and by carefully comparing the 
names and other data of all the shares in the dataset, we found that 106 stocks, of which 96 
were railways, disappeared from the COE price list due to name changes or mergers.9  Fourth, 
for the remaining 475 stocks, we searched the Times Digital Archive and the London Gazette 
to ascertain which stocks delisted due to failure: 112 of these stocks delisted for performance 
reasons.10 Another 262 stocks did not delist due to failure because they either merged with 
another company or were traded on another stock market. We were unable to find information 
for 111 stocks, even after performing a Google search. 
We make two assumptions about these 111 stocks.  First, we assume that all these 111 
stocks delisted due to failure.  Therefore, we categorize altogether 223 stocks as failed stocks 
in assumption 1 which provides a benchmark about the largest possible influence that the 
delisting bias could have on portfolio returns.  Second, we assume that, among these 111 stocks, 
only stocks that were listed for more than 36 months before disappearing failed, since it is 
possible that stocks that were listed for a short time before delisting were never fully established 
in the first place.  In this assumption, there are altogether 171 stocks which were categorized 
as failed stocks.  For both assumptions, we impose a -40% delisting return for the stocks that 
delisted due to failure and a 0% delisting return for the other delisted stocks.11   
Table 5 reports the summary statistics for each delisting assumption for portfolios 
sorted on size and dividend yield.  Under assumption 1, 35.42% of the delisted stocks are 
categorized as having failed, whereas under assumptions 2, 29.98% are categorized as having 
failed.   
<INSERT TABLE 5> 
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Panel A of Table 5 indicates that there is a clear relationship between size and failure. 
Smaller stocks are more likely to delist due to failure (i.e., higher failed/delisted ratio) and are 
more likely to fail in general (i.e., higher failed/total ratio).  This evidence is consistent with 
the view that smaller stocks are more likely to be marginal stocks that are less likely to survive 
adverse economic conditions (Chan and Chen, 1991).  However, the relationship between value 
and the various delisting measures is less clear.  Zero-yielding stocks are most likely to fail, 
but among stocks that pay non-zero dividends, stocks in portfolio high are most likely to fail, 
suggesting that they are more likely to be distressed stocks.  The failure rate for portfolio low, 
however, is greater than those for portfolios dp3 and dp4.   
Panel B in Table 5 reports the delisting-bias-adjusted size premiums and value 
premiums under our two delisting assumptions.  As expected, the delisting adjustment reduces 
the return on the portfolios with small stocks more so than it does on the portfolios with large 
stocks.  The size premium calculated using the 12-month holding period return has become 
negative after the delisting-bias adjustments.  On the other hand, we can see that the value 
premiums remain significantly different from zero in all cases after the delisting-bias 
adjustment.   
 
3.3 Robustness checks 
As mentioned above, one of the peculiarities of the British stock market over the sample period 
is the existence of stocks with partially-paid capital or extended liability.   In order to test 
whether the absence of the size effect and the presence of a value effect are caused by these 
special stocks, we examine the performance of the size and dividend-yield-sorted portfolios 
which contain only fully-paid limited liability stocks.  Table 6 displays the results.  Comparing 
Panel A of Table 6 to that of Table 3, we can see that the returns of all portfolios are lower in 
the subsample of standard stocks, suggesting that, in general, stocks with partially-paid capital 
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or extended liability perform better than standard stocks.  The reductions in returns are not even 
across the five size-sorted portfolios.  For example, the return for the portfolio small drops 
more than the other four portfolios.  Therefore, there is even less evidence of a size effect when 
we restrict the sample to fully-paid limited liability stocks.  
<INSERT TABLE 6> 
Panel B of Table 6, which displays the performance for the dividend-yield-sorted 
portfolios with only fully-paid limited liability stocks, indicates that the value premiums, which 
were significantly positive in the complete sample are not significantly different from zero.  
However, as we will see in the Fama-MacBeth regression results, this is not the case when we 
examine the marginal effects of the value indicator on stock returns.   
As the railway industry dominated our sample in the second half of our sample period, 
we exclude railway stocks to ensure that our conclusions are not being driven by the dominant 
industry.  The results which are displayed also in Table 6 suggest that the exclusion of railway 
stocks reduces the return to portfolio small, while raising the return to portfolio big.  Hence, 
the size premiums are even smaller than those in the entire sample.  In terms of the dividend-
yield-sorted portfolios, the exclusion of railway shares reduces more the returns on portfolio 
low than it does on portfolio high.  The value premiums are therefore even higher than those in 
the full sample.  Hence, excluding railway stocks from the sample, results in even stronger 
evidence for the presence of a value effect in this early market.   
As the number of ordinary shares is greater than the number of firms due to multiple 
equity issues, a firm with a large market capitalization may be composed of several stocks with 
small market capitalization.12  Consequently, the measurement of size based on the market 
capitalization of an individual stock may be questionable.  However, it is unlikely that this has 
a large influence on our conclusions.  First, more than 65% of multiple issues are in the railway 
sector, and we have confirmed that excluding railway shares from the analysis does not 
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qualitatively change our conclusions.  Second, many equity issues existed temporarily as 
newly-issued stocks and were quickly subsumed within the main share issue.  When we group 
the stocks issued by each firm in the same month into one firm observation, the number of 
firm-month observations is only 10% less than the number of stock-month observations.  
An examination of the performance of portfolios formed on the firm’s size and dividend 
yield confirms the above conjecture.  We calculate the market capitalization of a firm as the 
sum of market capitalization of its listed constituent ordinary stocks.  The dividend yield, 1-
month, and 12-month holding-period return of a firm are the equally-weighted averages of the 
firm’s constituent stocks.  In general, as shown in Table 6, we find that the results are in line 
with the stock-level portfolios.   
 
4. Fama-MacBeth regressions 
Previous studies of modern financial markets have highlighted the size pattern in the value 
premiums and the correlation of the size and value variables with many other stock 
characteristics (Loughran, 1997; Fama and French, 2006; Amihud and Mendelson, 1989).  Due 
to the relatively small number of stocks in our sample, Fama-MacBeth regressions may better 
allow us to examine the marginal effect of size and value on stock returns than a double-sorting 
or triple-sorting method within the portfolio framework.  In addition, it also allows us to 
examine the relationship between stock returns and several other stock characteristics, such as 
beta, illiquidity, momentum and reversal, in the nineteenth-century London stock market.       
We apply the Fama-MacBeth methodology as follows.  At each month of year t, we 
regress the return of an individual stock on selected explanatory variables in year t-1.  The first 
regression starts in January 1828 and the last regression ends in December 1870.  For each 
coefficient on the explanatory variables, we have 516 values, each corresponding to one month 
between January 1828 and December 1870.  The time-series average of these 516 values and 
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the related t-statistics tell us whether the relevant explanatory variable helps to explain stock 
returns.   
We test two specifications.  The first specification (S1) includes the following 
explanatory variables simultaneously: 1) the natural logarithm of a stock’s market 
capitalization at December of year t-1 (size); 2) the dividend yield in year t-1, calculated as the 
sum of dividends paid in the year divided by the December stock price (value); 3) the annual 
return of the stock in year t-1 (momentum); 4) the average annual return of the stock in the past 
3 years (reversal); 5) a measure of stock liquidity in year t-1 (illiquidity)13; 6) the market risk 
of a stock in year t-1 (beta).14  We also include in the regression the stock return in the last 
month (return_lm) in order to control for the bid-ask bounce.  To control for the delisting bias, 
we also run the same regressions with the delisting-bias-adjusted stock returns.  
<INSERT TABLE 7 > 
As can be seen in Table 7, which reports the results for the Fama-MacBeth regression, 
although the coefficients on the size indicator were significantly different from zero in 
specification 1 when we use the unadjusted stock return as the dependent variable, it is not the 
case for the regression of delisting-bias-adjusted returns.  The size effect, therefore, does not 
seem to exist in this early stock market once we control for the delisting bias and is 
economically small when we do not control it.  The coefficients on value are substantial both 
economically and statistically.  Furthermore, Table 7 shows that the value effect is robust to 
the delisting-bias adjustments.  In summary, the results of the regression analysis are largely 
consistent with the results from the portfolio analysis on the existence of the size and value 
effects in our sample.  
The coefficients on beta and illiquidity are all consistent with prior expectations.  That 
is, stocks with greater market risk and less liquidity tend to have greater return.  In addition, 
the regression results suggest that there is some evidence of a momentum effect in this early 
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market.  The coefficients on the momentum variable are significantly different from zero at the 
10% level in all cases. This evidence is consistent with findings from the modern UK stock 
market (Liu et al., 1999; Hon and Tonks, 2003).   
Interestingly, although previous studies document the existence of a reversal effect in 
the modern UK market (Dissanaike, 1999; Galariotis et al., 2007; Wu and Li, 2011), results 
from the historical UK market suggest otherwise.  We find that the coefficients on the reversal 
variable are not significantly different from zero indicating that the reversal effect may not 
exist in our sample.  This result implies that the overreaction hypothesis cannot be the sole 
explanation for the reversal effect discovered in the modern era.  If investor’s overreaction 
causes the reversal effect, the nonexistence of it in our sample suggests that the nineteenth-
century investors did not overreact to price-influencing information, which is hard to believe 
given that the market in this era was dominated by individual investors.  On the other hand, the 
nonexistence of the reversal effect should be expected in a market without taxes if its existence 
is due to tax-loss selling behavior.  
In the second specification (S2), in addition to the variables mentioned above, we also 
include in the regression a dummy variable (special_stock) which indicates whether the stock 
had partially-paid capital or extended liability, and the interaction term between this dummy 
variable and the size variable (size_special) and the value variable (value_special).  The 
purpose of specification 2 is to test the distress risk hypothesis.  If size and value indicators are 
proxies for distress risk, we expect to find that the size effect and value effect to be much 
stronger in the special stocks.  Taking the value effect as an example, this can be seen more 
clearly through the following reasoning: if the value premium appears due to the greater 
distress risk of the value stocks, then value premium = (distress risk of value stock – distress 
risk of growth stock) × price of distress risk.  As distress will have much greater influence on 
the personal wealth of the shareholders of special stocks, the price of distress risk should be 
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higher for the special stocks than the standard stocks.  Therefore, the value premium of special 
stocks should be higher than the value premium of standard stocks.   
The results of specification 2, as reported in Table 7, indicate that the coefficients on 
the special_stock dummy variables are significantly positive, suggesting that the stocks with 
extended liability and uncalled capital have greater returns than the standard limited liability 
stocks.  This evidence is consistent with the findings in Acheson et al (2012) which, by 
excluding other possibilities, conclude that this arises due to the possible call on shareholders’ 
personal wealth for these special stocks.  That is, although the special stocks may not 
necessarily have higher distress risk, the costs to their shareholders of distress are higher so 
that shareholders demanded higher returns to compensate such greater costs of distress.  The 
positive coefficients on the special_stock dummy, therefore, suggest that the price of distress 
risk may indeed be higher for special stocks than for the standard stocks.   
However, our results also reveal that the coefficients on the size_special and 
value_special variables are not significantly differently from zero.  Hence, the negative relation 
between size and return, and the positive relation between value and return are not significantly 
stronger in the special stocks.  As explained previously, the opposite should be observed if the 
distress risk explanation for the size and value effects holds.   
 
5. Conclusions 
In this study, we make use of a unique dataset for the British stock market for the period 1825 
to 1870 to investigate whether the two asset pricing anomalies which have attracted the most 
attention in the literature, namely the size and value effects, existed in this nascent capital 
market.  We also examine the relationship between stock return and several other stock 
characteristics, namely, beta, illiquidity and short-term and long-term past returns.  In general, 
the stock return patterns in this nascent stock market show both similarities with and 
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differences to the modern market.  Thus, these results allow researchers to evaluate the validity 
of several well-known stock-return patterns discovered in modern stock markets. 
Our first main finding is that the size premium is not significantly different from zero.  
The size premium is reduced even further when we correct for delisting bias since smaller 
stocks are subject to a greater delisting bias.  Our finding is also robust when we limit the 
sample to either non-railway shares or fully-paid limited liability stocks.  In addition, multiple 
equity issues do not influence our findings.  We also find that the Fama-French three-factor 
model largely explains the performance of size-sorted portfolios.  The nonexistence of the size 
effect in this early stock market is consistent with the view that some of the anomalies 
discovered in modern era may simply be the result of data-snooping.  Given the instability of 
the size premium over time, further empirical studies need to focus on the long-term 
performance of stock returns in order to understand what factors may have caused the advent 
and disappearance of the size effect and which institutional, financial or behavioral reasons 
could explain the variation of the size premium over time.  
Our second main finding is that the value premium is positive in this early stock market.  
The adjustments for delisting bias and multiple equity issues reduce the level of value premium 
slightly, but it remains significantly different from zero.  In addition, neither the Fama-French 
three-factor model nor the CAPM are able to explain away the significantly positive intercept 
on the portfolio with the highest dividend yield.  The fact that the value effect also exists in the 
nineteenth-century London market suggests that, unlike the size effect, it is a pervasive 
phenomenon and there may be economic or behavioral reasons for its existence.        
In our empirical analysis, we make use of the existence of stocks with unlimited liability 
and uncalled capital in the early London market to test the distress risk explanation of the value 
effect.  However, we find little evidence to support this popular explanation for the value effect.  
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Thus, future theoretical and empirical research may need to focus on different types of 
systematic risk or behavioral reasons to explain the value effect.    
Thirdly, even though the stock market investigated in this study is more than 150 years 
old, the stock return patterns are in many cases consistent with the modern stock market.  For 
example, in this early market, the market risk and illiquidity both positively influence the stock 
return and there was also some evidence of a momentum effect.  However, we find no evidence 
of the reversal effect.  Considering the institutional environment of the London market in this 
era, we think that this may suggest that the appearance of the reversal effect in the modern 
market is due to investors’ tax-loss selling behavior rather than investor overreaction.  
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for the Main Variables in the Course of the Exchange 
Dataset, 1825-1870 
 
Dividend 
rate (%) 
Stock 
price (£) 
Nominal 
value (£) 
Par 
 value (£) 
Par value/ 
nominal 
value 
Number of 
shares 
 
 
Panel A: All stocks 
Mean 7.12 68.09 69.53 46.88 0.73 20,712 
Median 5.00 27.50 50.00 25.00 1.00 10,000 
Standard deviation 18.81 154.22 84.33 48.01 0.37 32,785 
Obs 122,414 94,438 122,414 122,414 122,414 122,414 
Panel B: Fully-paid limited liability stocks 
Mean 7.59 101.53 70.31 70.31 1.00 16,190 
Median 4.50 53.00 83.50 83.50 1.00 6,000 
Standard deviation 24.31 201.35 50.56 50.56 0.00 30,952 
Obs 62,737 49,950 62,737 62,737 62,737 62,737 
Panel C: Stocks with either uncalled capital or extended shareholder liability  
Mean 6.63 30.48 68.72 22.24 0.44 25,466 
Median 5.00 16.50 50.00 13.00 0.35 14,400 
Standard deviation 10.20 47.95 109.08 29.28 0.33 33,964 
Obs 59,677 44,488 59,677 59,677 59,677 59,677 
Notes: The number of observations for stock price exclude the months where a stock price is 
missing.   
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Table 2. Summary Statistics of Size-Sorted Portfolios  
 
 
small s2 s3 s4 big 
Panel A:  British stock market, 1825-1870 
size (£) 41,487 127,642 274,330 583,491 2,374,861 
share (%) 1.31 4.00 8.32 17.42 68.95 
DP (%) 4.98 4.94 4.64 4.48 4.44 
no. stock 32 32 32 32 34 
delisting rate (%) 12.56 6.79 6.22 4.37 3.60 
past return (%) 1.61 5.84 6.98 8.68 7.64 
illiquidity 0.17 0.13 0.10 0.08 0.04 
zdp (%) 38.92 20.85 17.43 11.05 6.45 
low (%) 13.15 16.99 21.71 24.37 26.78 
dp3 (%) 11.87 16.07 17.27 23.72 35.88 
dp4 (%) 14.34 21.43 20.78 24.66 22.66 
high (%) 21.73 27.47 25.07 18.78 12.63 
Panel B: British stock market, 1870-1913 
share (%) 0.60 1.40 2.90 6.90 86.30 
past return (%) -3.23 7.05 7.70 9.75 10.33 
delisting rate (%) 9.75 3.00 2.40 2.90 3.56 
zdp (%) 48.10 24.35 19.55 16.05 15.34 
low (%) 9.30 16.00 17.35 21.95 31.58 
dp3 (%) 11.18 16.60 21.60 21.25 23.24 
dp4 (%) 12.73 20.65 20.75 22.45 17.71 
high (%) 18.73 22.35 20.80 18.30 12.12 
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Rt - Rf (%) 9.03 1.10 1.45 1.75 2.71 
Panel C: US stock market, 1926-1999 
share (%) 0.50 1.50 3.50 9.30 85.10 
past return (%) 4.20 15.30 18.70 19.15 16.51 
delisting rate (%) 13.65 6.85 5.80 5.25 3.86 
zdp (%) 66.10 42.90 29.80 19.25 8.28 
low (%) 7.65 11.90 15.65 20.55 28.04 
dp3 (%) 6.33 12.50 16.65 21.70 26.36 
dp4 (%) 7.80 14.55 18.50 20.50 22.07 
high (%) 12.18 18.15 19.40 18.00 15.33 
Rt - Rf (%) 24.38 9.50 7.65 5.55 4.78 
Notes: small, s2, s3, s4 and big represent the five quintiles formed on market capitalization. 
size is the average market capitalization for stocks included in each portfolio at the time of 
formation.  DP is the average dividend yield for stocks included in each portfolio at the year 
of formation.  share is the fraction of the total sample market capitalization of each portfolio.  
no. stock is the average number of stocks in each portfolio.  illiquidity is the proportion of 
months with no trades in the year of portfolio construction.  delisting rate is the percentage of 
stocks that disappeared from the portfolio in the year after the formation.  past return represents 
the annual return of stocks in the year of formation.  zdp, low, dp3, dp4, and high show the 
percentage of stocks in each size-sorted portfolio that pay no dividends, and that have dividend 
yield in the lowest, 2nd lowest, 2nd highest, and highest quartiles of dividend-paying stocks.  
The statistics in Panel B and Panel C are calculated from Tables 3, 4 and 5 of Grossman and 
Shore (2006).  Rt - Rf  represents the annual excess return of each portfolio in the year after 
formation.  
Table 3. Performance of Portfolios Sorted on Size and Dividend Yield 
 Unadjusted  
returns 
CAPM-adjusted 
returns 
Fama and French three-factor-
adjusted returns 
 1-month 
holding-
period 
12-month 
holding-
period 
CAPM-
adjusted 
beta 
three-
factor-
adjusted 
beta 
SMB 
loadings 
HML 
loadings 
Panel A: Portfolios formed on size 
small 
0.730 7.379 0.387 
0.698 
0.203 
0.877 0.793 0.241 
(4.88) (4.63) (2.74) (1.48) 
s2 
0.620 6.880 0.280 
0.694 
0.124 
0.843 0.655 0.220 
(5.90) (4.63) (3.09) (1.45) 
s3 
0.635 6.459 0.229 
1.061 
0.093 
1.202 0.716 0.068 
(5.68) (5.83) (3.07) (1.50) 
s4 
0.545 5.733 0.148 
0.958 
0.093 
1.014 0.167 0.128 
(6.02) (5.09) (2.79) (1.75) 
big 
0.419 5.108 0.022 
0.953 
0.018 
0.959 -0.009 0.026 
(4.85) (4.77) (0.85) (0.67) 
small-big 
0.311 2.270 0.364  0.185    
(2.13)** (1.41) (2.56)**  (1.33)    
GRS test   4.48*** 1.74 
Panel B: Portfolios formed on dividend yield 
zdp 
0.599 
(3.11) 
4.685 0.127 
1.637 
-0.084 
1.871 0.932 0.230 
(2.09) (0.86) (0.58) 
low 
0.509 
(5.38) 
5.647 0.128 
0.842 
0.085 
0.907 0.472 -0.188 
(4.85) (1.88) (1.37) 
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dp3 
0.479 
(7.34) 
6.406 0.122 
0.680 
0.064 
0.747 0.279 0.039 
(5.83) (3.04) (1.59) 
dp4 
0.516 5.819 0.162 
0.643 
0.100 
0.696 0.177 0.162 
(7.65) (6.65) (3.42) (2.22) 
high 
0.896 11.053 0.523 
0.705 
0.332 
0.855 0.507 0.540 
(8.47) (7.02) (6.02) (5.63) 
high-low 
0.387 5.406 0.395  0.247    
(3.75)*** (3.30)*** (3.81)***  (3.45)***    
GRS test   8.96*** 8.01*** 
Notes: small, s2, s3, s4 and big represent the five quintiles formed on market capitalization.  
zdp is the portfolio of stocks which paid zero dividends.  low, dp3, dp4, and high represent the 
four quartiles formed on dividend yield. The time-series mean returns reported in the table are 
the equally-weighted average returns of stocks included in the portfolios.  The CAPM-adjusted 
returns are the intercepts in the following regressions: Rt-Rf,t=a+b0(Rm,t-Rf,t)+b1(Rm,t-1-
Rf,t-1)+b2(Rm,t-2-Rf,t-2)+et .  The regressions use the 1-month holding period returns.  The 
monthly yield on 3% Consols is the proxy for the risk-free rate.  The three-factor-adjusted 
returns are the intercepts in the following regressions:   
R t-Rf,t=a+b0(Rm,t-Rf,t)+b1(Rm,t-1-Rf,t-1)+b2(Rm,t-2-Rf,t-2)+s0SMBt+s1SMBt-1+s2SMBt-2t 
+h0HML+h1𝐻𝑀𝐿t-1+h2HMLt-2+et 
The SMB and HML factors are calculated following Fama and French (1993).  The reported 
betas are the sums of b0, b1 and b2.  Similarly, the SMB loadings are the sums of s0, s1 and s2. 
The HML loadings are the sums of h0, h1 and h2.    *, **, and *** represent significant at 10%, 
5% and 1% respectively.  The GRS F-statistics test whether the regression intercepts are jointly 
equal to zero.   
Table 4. Summary Statistics of Dividend-Yield-Sorted Portfolios  
 zdp low dp3 dp4 high 
Panel A:  British stock market, 1825-1870 
size (£) 224,431 675,842 1,218,467 799,623 377,516 
share (%) 7.97 21.42 33.67 23.78 13.16 
DP (%) 0.00 2.78 4.50 5.50 9.79 
no. stock 29 33 33 33 35 
past return (%) -2.91 9.26 8.18 6.99 6.88 
delisting rate (%) 11.30 6.63 3.84 4.65 6.53 
illiquidity 0.14 0.10 0.08 0.09 0.11 
small (%) 43.25 12.29 11.24 13.66 20.39 
s2 (%) 23.06 16.14 15.33 20.82 25.88 
s3 (%) 17.34 20.93 16.52 19.91 23.97 
s4 (%) 10.35 24.03 22.66 23.58 17.81 
big (%) 5.99 26.61 34.25 22.03 11.96 
Panel B: British stock market, 1870-1913 
share (%) 13.30 37.50 25.60 12.90 8.70 
DP (%) 0.00 3.70 5.30 6.60 11.00 
past return (%) 4.00 11.80 9.10 8.10 7.60 
delisting rate (%) 5.40 4.10 2.70 2.00 2.20 
Rt - Rf (%) -1.90 0.60 1.40 2.60 2.10 
Panel C: US stock market, 1926-1999 
share (%) 6.40 30.70 25.80 21.90 15.30 
DP (%) 0.00 2.30 4.10 5.70 13.30 
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past return (%) 22.30 27.30 16.90 10.80 7.00 
delisting rate (%) 7.50 5.80 5.10 3.40 2.80 
Rt-Rf (%) 9.80 4.20 6.10 8.50 8.00 
Notes: zdp is the portfolio of stocks which paid zero dividends.  low, dp3, dp4, and high 
represent the four quartiles formed on dividend yield.  size is the average market capitalization 
for stocks included in each portfolio at the time of formation.  DP is the average dividend yield 
for stocks included in each portfolio at the year of formation.  share is the fraction of the total 
sample market capitalization of each portfolio.  no. stock is the average number of stocks in 
each portfolio.  illiquidity is the proportion of months with no trades in the year of portfolio 
construction.  delisting rate is the percentage of stocks that disappeared from the portfolio in 
the year after the formation.  past return represents the annual return of stocks in the year of 
formation.  small, s2, s3, s4, and big show the percentage of stocks in each dividend-yield-
sorted portfolio that have market capitalization in one of the five portfolios formed on size.  
The statistics in Panel B and Panel C are obtained from Tables 9 and 10 of Grossman and Shore 
(2006).  Rt-Rf  represents the excess return of each portfolio in the year after formation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5. Summary Statistics for the Delisting Assumptions and Delisting-Bias-Adjusted 
Returns  
 Assumption 1 Assumption 2  
Panel A: Summary statistics for the delisting assumptions 
 
failed/delisted 
(%) 
failed/total 
(%) 
failed/delisted 
(%) 
failed/total 
(%) 
market 35.42 1.80 29.98 1.53 
     
Portfolios formed on size 
small 45.81 5.93 37.61 4.78 
s2 26.34 1.61 22.49 1.42 
s3 19.04 1.01 19.04 1.01 
s4 7.31 0.50 7.31 0.50 
big 4.76 0.05 4.76 0.05 
Portfolios formed on dividend yield 
zdp 43.77 4.47 37.02 3.63 
low 13.54 0.61 12.50 0.53 
dp3 16.35 0.51 14.42 0.40 
dp4 24.52 0.99 24.52 0.99 
high 30.95 1.87 27.16 1.61 
Panel B: Delisting-bias-adjusted returns 
 
1-month  
holding-period  
12-month 
holding-period  
1-month  
holding-period  
12-month 
holding-period 
small-big 0.002 -1.589 0.062 -1.018 
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(0.01) (1.09) (0.41) (0.72) 
high-low 
0.327 4.154 0.334 4.236 
(3.21)*** (2.66)** (3.29)*** (2.71)** 
Notes: failed/delisted is the percentage of delisted stocks that are identified as failed under 
various assumptions.  failed/total is the percentage of all stocks in each portfolio that are 
identified as failed.  In the market row, all the variables are calculated using the market portfolio.   
In Assumption 1, all the 111 stocks for which the delisting reasons cannot be identified (and 
the 112 stocks that were known to have failed) are categorized as having failed.  Assumption 
2 is similar to Assumption 1 except that, among the 111 unidentified delisting stocks, only 
those which were listed for at least 36 months were categorized as having failed.  small, s2, s3, 
s4, and big represent the five size-sorted portfolios.  zdp, low, dp3, dp4 and high represent the 
five portfolios formed on dividend yield.  *, **, and *** represent significant at 10%, 5% and 
1% respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6. Performance of Size-Sorted and Dividend-Yield-Sorted Portfolios in 
Subsamples 
 Fully-paid stocks Non-railway stocks Firm-level analysis 
 1-month 
holding-
period  
12-month 
holding-
period  
1-month 
holding-
period  
12-month 
holding-
period  
1-month 
holding-
period  
12-month 
holding-
period  
Panel A: Portfolios formed on size 
small 0.439 4.706 0.696 6.748 0.612 0.505 
0.463 s2 0.548 6.034 0.597 6.324 0.645 
s3 0.495 4.876 0.614 6.541 0.630 0.616 
s4 0.409 4.114 0.527 5.521 0.544 0.562 
big 0.380 4.321 0.490 5.456 0.482 0.488 
       
small-big 0.059 0.642 0.206 1.276 0.131 0.168 
(0.36) (0.34) (1.30) (0.88) (0.84) (0.16) 
Panel B: Portfolios formed on dividend yield 
zdp 0.253 3.322 0.563 4.488 0.577  5.186  
low 0.480 5.454 0.471 4.774 0.507 4.903 
dp3 0.322 5.055 0.482 6.055 0.483 5.073 
dp4 0.494 5.653 0.575 6.582 0.576 5.370 
high 0.664 7.815 0.884 11.269 0.855 7.425 
       
high-low 
0.185 2.361 0.413 6.494 0.348 2.522 
(1.54) (1.52) (3.77)*** (3.96)*** (3.41)*** (2.49)** 
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Notes: small, s2, s3, s4 and big represent the five quintiles formed on market capitalization. 
zdp is the portfolio of stocks which paid zero dividends.  low, dp3, dp4, and high represent the 
four quartiles formed on dividend yield.  The time-series mean returns reported in the table are 
the equally-weighted average returns of stocks included in the portfolios. Fully-paid stocks 
refers to the subsample of stocks which have limited liability and are fully paid up. Non-railway 
stocks refers to the subsample of all non-railway stocks. Firm-level analysis refers to the 
subsample where the portfolios are formed on a firm rather than stock level. *, **, and *** 
represent significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7. Fama-MacBeth Regression Results  
 S1 S2 
 
Unadjusted 
return 
Delisting 
assumption 1 
Delisting 
assumption 2 
Unadjusted 
return 
Delisting 
assumption 1 
Delisting 
assumption 2 
constant 0.929 0.445 0.422 0.632 0.310 0.291 
 (2.14)** (0.99) (0.94) (1.36) (0.65) (0.61) 
size -0.074 -0.037 -0.036 -0.053 -0.030 -0.029 
 (2.50)** (1.22) (1.19) (1.70)* (0.96) (0.93) 
value 5.749 5.869 5.876 4.627 4.68 4.719 
 (3.68)*** (3.62)*** (3.62)*** (2.54)** (2.48)** (2.50)** 
momentum 0.499 0.601 0.595 0.503 0.597 0.589 
 (1.72)* (2.06)**  (2.03)**  (1.75)* (2.06)**  (2.03)**  
reversal -0.156 -0.007 -0.012 -0.147 -0.004 -0.009 
 (0.36) (0.05) (0.08) (0.35) (0.03) (0.06) 
illiquidity 0.753 0.435 0.470 0.693 0.405 0.441 
 (3.87)*** (2.11)** (2.29)** (3.49)*** (1.91)* (2.09)** 
beta 0.406 0.393 0.401 0.413 0.423 0.430 
 (3.31)*** (3.06)*** (3.13)*** (3.35)*** (3.32)*** (3.39)*** 
return_lm -8.877 -8.676 -8.717 -8.835 -8.639 -8.679 
 (9.14)*** (8.89)*** (8.91)*** (9.06)*** (8.82)*** (8.84)*** 
special_stock    0.224 0.156 0.156 
    (2.81)*** (1.96)* (1.95)* 
size_special    -0.058 0.011 0.012 
    (1.02) (0.19) (0.21) 
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value_special    2.719 3.608 3.49 
    (0.90) (1.15) (1.12) 
obs 123 123 123 123 123 123 
R2 0.118 0.115 0.116 0.137 0.136 0.136 
Notes: The Fama-MacBeth regressions are carried out by regressing the monthly returns on 
individual stocks in year t on several explanatory variables for the same stock in year t-1.  In 
Assumption 1, all the 111 stocks for which the delisting reasons cannot be identified (and the 
112 stocks that were known to have failed) are categorized  as having failed.  Assumption 2 is 
similar to Assumption 1 except that, among the 111 unidentified delisting stocks, only those 
which were listed for at least 36 months were categorized as having failed.  constant is the 
intercept of the regression.  size is the natural logarithm of the market capitalization of the stock 
in December of year t-1.  value is the dividend yield of the stock in year t-1.  beta represents 
the market risk of individual stock in year t-1.  return_lm  is the total return for the stock in the 
prior month.  momentum is the total return for the stock in year t-1. reversal is the average 
return for the stock in the past 3 years.  illiquidity is the proportion of months with no trades in 
year t-1.  special_stock is a dummy variable that equals one if the stock has partially-paid 
capital or extended liability.  size_special  represents the interaction terms between the 
special_stock dummy variable and the demeaned size. value_special represents the interaction 
terms between the special_stock dummy variable and the demeaned value.  obs column shows 
the average number of observations per monthly regression.  R2s are adjusted for degrees of 
freedom.  *, **, and *** indicate significant level of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.   
 
 
1 In order to protect themselves from potential questions raised by their clients, stock-brokers usually marked the 
bargain (i.e., entered it on a slip of paper, which they signed and put in a box) when a trade was completed. This 
bargain was included in the official record of business done, which was given in the Stock Exchange price list 
(Withers, 1910, p.258).  
2 However, dual capacity existed in the nineteenth century as sometimes brokers also made a market to stimulate 
interest in particular securities, and jobbers sometimes had direct contacts with outside large investors (Michie, 
1999, pp. 113-4).   
3 Each individual stock price series was analyzed so as to pick up data-inputting errors or printing mistakes in the 
Course of the Exchange. If a share price was substantially out of line with prices either side of it, the Course of 
the Exchange was double-checked, and in the event that it was not a data-inputting error, it was deleted and the 
previous reported price was used as the current month’s price. This, however, was extremely uncommon. 
4 Dimson et al. (2003) suggest that the dividend yield is a good measure of value in the modern UK market.  
5 For both the size-sorted and the dividend-yield-sorted portfolios, the findings are similar when we use the value-
weighted returns. 
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6 We construct Small and Big portfolios using the median market capitalization of stocks at December each year 
as the breakpoint; we also construct High, Medium, and Low portfolios using the 30th and the 70th percentiles of 
the dividend yield at December as the breakpoints.  From these, we get six intersection portfolios, namely, Small 
High, Small Medium, Small Low, Big High, Big Medium, and Big Low.  SMB is the average return on the three 
small portfolios minus the average return on the three big portfolios.  HML is the average return on the two high 
portfolios minus the average return on the two low portfolios.  The zero-yielding stocks are excluded in 
constructing the SMB and HML factors. 
7 To determine the number of leads and lags, we regressed the excess returns on the size-sorted and dividend-
yield-sorted portfolios on the current market excess return, and also its n lags and m leads. We then calculated the 
market beta as the value-weighted average of the individual portfolio betas for the five size-sorted portfolios or 
the five dividend-yield-sorted portfolios.  Among all the combinations of lags and leads we tried, the combination 
of 2 lags and 0 leads produces the market beta that is closest to 1 for both the size-sorted portfolios and dividend-
yield-sorted portfolios.  Adjusting betas using the Fowler and Rorke (1983) correction leads to trivial changes in 
the betas.  
8 The Investor’s Monthly Manual published information for stocks listed in both London and regional stock 
exchanges from 1864 onwards.  
9 Mergers were uncommon in the UK (apart from railways) until the 1880s and 90s (Sykes, 1926; Cottrell, 1980; 
Supple, 1970, pp.298-9) 
10 The London Gazette is an official publication where statutory notices are published. The Times Digital Archive 
is a fully-searchable archive of the The Times newspaper, which had by far the largest and widest circulation of 
any newspaper in the nineteenth century. 
11 The -40% delisting return was chosen because Shumway (1997) reports that NYSE and AMEX firms that 
disappeared due to performance reasons had roughly a -40% delisting return.  Replacing the -40% delisting return 
with the -55% delisting return for the stocks which delisted from the Nasdaq for poor performance ( Shumway 
and Warther, 1999), does not change our conclusions.  
12 Apart from the railway sector, preference or preferred shares were uncommon in this period (Jefferys, 1977). 
13 There is no data on trading volume, bid-ask spread or turnover rate in this early stock market.  We try to measure 
stock liquidity with the available information on stock prices.  In particular, we measure the annual liquidity of a 
stock as the proportion of months with no trades in a particular year.  This measure mainly focuses on how 
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frequently a stock was traded so that an investor could sell the stock easily when necessary.  It is in essence a 
measure of illiquidity because greater incidence of no trades indicates a less liquid stock.   
14 To reduce the errors-in-variables problem, the market risk of individual stocks is estimated as follows.  First, 
we form sixteen portfolios based on size (four quartiles) and dividend yield (four quartiles) at December each 
year. The equally-weighted returns for the sixteen portfolios are calculated in the following year, and this process 
is repeated between 1825 and 1869 so that each portfolio has a time-series of monthly returns between January 
1826 and December 1870.  Second, we estimate the market betas for the sixteen portfolios by regressing the 
portfolio excess returns on the market excess return.  Third, the beta of each stock at each year is the beta of the 
portfolio in which this stock is assigned to in that particular year.   
 
